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Note
PROBATION REVOCATION IN MARYLAND: THE EFFECT
OF NONFINAL AND REVERSED CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Probation is a process by which a convicted offender may avoid
incarceration and effect his own rehabilitation under the supervision of
a probation officer. After placing a convict on probation, a court may
revoke his conditional liberty and impose custodial punishment for his
original offense if he violates one or more conditions of his probation.'
These conditions vary,2 but one of the most common, and the subject of
this Note, is that the probationer "obey all laws."
In two recent cases, Dean v. State3 and Hutchinson v. State,4 the
1. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 276, 208 A.2d
575, 581 (1965) ("all that is required is that the facts before him be such that the judge
reasonably could be satisfied that the conduct of the probationer has not been what he
agreed it would .... "). See also Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947) ("All that is required is that the evidence and facts be
such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as
good as required by the conditions of probation.").
Due process may require more than just proving a breach of a condition of supervi-
sion to justify revoking probation. A subjective determination of whether the violation war-
rants revocation is also contemplated. Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 193 n.3 (1978) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) and Canton v. Smith, 486 F.2d 733, 735 (7th
Cir. 1973)). Accord, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-7.3 commentary at 513 (1980) ("incarceration should not au-
tomatically result from a violation of conditions and . . . it is, in all events, improper
without detailed consideration of the importance of the violation and the risk that the de-
fendant would pose were the defendant permitted to continue at large."). See generally
Mutter, Probation in the Criminal Court ofBaltimore City, 17 MD. L. REV. 309 (1957).
2. Conditions of probation are set by the trial court under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 641A (1982). Special conditions of probation, because they are drafted by the trial judge,
are numerous and varied. See generally Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 429 A.2d 1029 (1981)
(probationer required to make restitution payments); Humphrey v. State, 290 Md. 164, 428
A.2d 440 (1981) (probationer required to receive drug treatment); Hudgins v. State, No. 70,
September Term, 1981 (Md. Jan. 6, 1982) (probationer required to cooperate with the Mary-
land State Police in tracking down criminals). Probation statutes in some jurisdictions limit
the trial court's discretion by requiring that only certain types of conditions may be imposed.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1982). For an excellent discussion of the consti-
tutional and statutory limits on the substantive content of conditions, see Note, LegalAspects
ofProbation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311 (1959).
3. 291 Md. 198, 434 A.2d 552 (1981).
4. 292 Md. 367, 438 A.2d 1335 (1982).
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Maryland Court of Appeals has taken a confusing approach to the ef-
fect that a subsequent criminal conviction has on the probationer's con-
ditional liberty. With Hutchinson, Maryland joined the majority of
jurisdictions that permit a conviction pending appellate review to serve
as the sole basis for probation revocation. Yet in Dean, the Court of
Appeals suggested that such a revocation may be vitiated when the sub-
sequent conviction is reversed on appeal. Furthermore, the court in
Dean held open this possibility even in cases where the revoking judge
relied only in part on a criminal conviction pending appeal. Further
"analysis of these issues, however, will be more profitably undertaken
against the background of some general principles governing probation
revocation proceedings.
II. PROBATION REVOCATION
A. Background
Probation is not a punitive sanction; rather, it is a means of reha-
bilitating the offender.5 It is considered to be available as a matter of
grace and discretion,6 but a trial judge enjoys considerably less freedom
in revoking probation than he does in granting it.' In this regard,
Maryland's probation law is typical. Before exercising his discretion to
revoke probation, a revoking judge must be "reasonably satisfied"8
both that the probationer violated a condition of probation and that
this violation did not result from circumstances beyond the proba-
tioner's control.9 These findings are subject to reversal if clearly
erroneous. 
10
Constitutional requirements also restrict a judge's discretion to re-
voke probation. In Morrissey v. Brewer," the Supreme Court set forth
5. See Mutter, supra note 1, at 309.
6. In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) the Supreme Court referred to the con-
ditional freedom as a "privilege" or "an act of grace extended to one convicted of a crime."
This "privilege" rationale has been echoed by the courts. See, e.g., Kaylor v. State, 285 Md.
66, 75, 400 A.2d 419, 424 (1979).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 8-18.
8. Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 276, 208 A.2d 575, 581 (1965). See also Knight v. State,
7 Md. App. 313, 318, 225 A.2d 441, 444 (1969); Smith v. State, 11 Md. App. 317, 318, 273
A.2d 626, 627 (1971); Rites v. State, 15 Md. App. 346, 348, 290 A.2d 554, 556 (1972).
Although the "reasonable satisfaction" standard is clearly the test for probation rev-
ocation in a majority of jurisdictions, several states have adopted different formulations of
the burden. See, e.g., State v. Bettencourt, 112 R.I. 706, 710, 315 A.2d 53, 55 (1974) (reason-
ably satisfactory evidence); People v. Smith, 105 Ill. App. 2d 14, 18, 245 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1969)
(preponderance of the evidence).
9. Humphrey v. State, 290 Md. 164, 167-68, 428 A.2d 440, 443 (1981).
10. Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 308-09, 429 A.2d 1029, 1035 (1981).
11. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
1983]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
a list of protections governing proceedings to revoke conditional lib-
erty. It held that the judicial proceeding in which a court determines
that a condition of parole has been violated must meet minimum due
process standards under the fourteenth amendment.' 2 These include a
written notice of the specific conditions of parole allegedly violated, a
disclosure of evidence against the parolee, an opportunity to be heard,
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, a neutral
and detached tribunal, and a written statement by the revoking court of
the evidence relied on and reasons for revocation.' 3 In Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,'4 the Supreme Court held that revocation ofprobation is con-
stitutionally indistinguishable from parole revocation. 5 The Court
also ruled that at probation revocation proceedings where the proba-
tioner may have difficulty presenting his version of disputed facts with-
out examining or cross-examining witnesses, or presenting complex
documentary evidence, the probationer has a right to the presence and
assistance of counsel. ' 6 In every case in which the assistance of counsel
at revocation hearings is denied, the grounds for such refusal must be
stated succinctly in the record.'7 In Maryland, however, counsel may
not be denied to a probationer who has not waived the right. 8
Despite the Morrissey-Gagnon minimum due process require-
ments, ' 9 a probationer facing a revocation hearing is entitled to consid-
erably less procedural protection than is a criminal defendant at trial.
This informality is primarily a result of the state's lesser burden of
proof" and the absence of strict evidentiary rules in a revocation hear-
ing.2" Evidence admissible in a revocation proceeding constitutionally
12. Id. at 489.
13. Id.
14. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
15. Id. at 782 n.3.
There is, of course, no constitutional right to probation. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S.
490, 492 (1935). It is generally recognized, however, that if a protection not granted by the
Constitution is provided by state statute with respect to a liberty interest, revocation of that
safeguard must be in compliance with minimum standards of due process. Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).
16. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
17. Id. at 791.
18. State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 158, 395 A.2d 475, 479 (1978).
19. See supra notes 11-18.
20. See supra note 8.
21. Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575, 581 (1965). The court drew an anal-
ogy between the imposition of original sentence and a revocation hearing: "In the determi-
nation of a proper sentence a judge may utilize information obtained outside the courtroom,
information furnished by those not subject to cross-examination and sometimes hearsay
. .. Id. See M.R.P. 761 (judge may consider pre-sentencing investigation report). See
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may include evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure,22
evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda rule,2 3 and most forms of
hearsay evidence.24 The admissibility of such evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court.25
These relaxed rules and the lesser burden of proof streamline the
probation revocation procedure, allowing hearings to consume much
less judicial and prosecutorial resources, and thus promote a workable
probation system. Without such informal procedures, a revocation
judge would be unable expeditiously to take away a probationer's con-
ditional liberty. Hence, requiring stricter procedural protections might
make judges reluctant to grant probation in the first place, for fear that
once granted, it will be difficult to revoke.26 This emphasis on effi-
ciency, however, does not deprive the probationer of a level of fairness
commensurate with the conditional nature of his freedom. As a con-
victed criminal, a probationer is not entitled to have his "liberty" pro-
tected by the full due process safeguards shielding unconditional
Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 (1969). But see Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d
138, 140 (1979) (hearsay is not admissible in a probation revocation proceeding).
In Morrissey the Supreme Court recognized informal rules of evidence as consistent
with the requisite minimum standard of due process to which a parolee is constitutionally
entitled. While acknowledging that due process requires that the revocation court extend a
parolee the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (provided good cause for
disallowing confrontation is not shown) the Court said: "the process should be flexible
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not
be admissible in an adversary criminal trial." 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon the Court simi-
larly stated in dictum that a probationer has the right to confront adverse witnesses, but went
on to qualify this by holding that "technical rules of procedure or evidence" are not within
the due process mandate. 411 U.S. at 786-87.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex
rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174,
178, 304 A.2d 647, 649 (1973). Courts reason that because the purpose behind the exclusion
of such evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct, little is to be gained from sup-
pressing this evidence at a revocation hearing, because the evidence is often highly relevant
and probative of guilt. See Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 74 MICH. L. REV. 525,
527 n.10 (1976) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 121, 305 A.2d 701, 711 (1973); State
v. Fimbres, 108 Ariz. 430, 432, 501 P.2d 14, 16 (1972); Clark v. State, 222 So. 2d 766, 767
(Fla. App. 1969).
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208
A.2d 575, 581 (1965).
25. Jurisdictions differ as to their willingness to accept controversial forms of evidence at
revocation hearings. For example, the extent to which hearsay evidence may be used differs
in many jurisdictions according to their interpretations of the Gagnon rule. At least one
court holds that hearsay is not admissible unless the revocation judge can specifically justify
its use. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 234 Pa. Super. 31, 45-46, 336 A.2d 616, 624 (1975).
Some jurisdictions have gone a step further, holding hearsay evidence inadmissible provided
a timely objection is made and the hearsay remains uncorroborated by the probationer him-
self. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 600 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. Crim. 1980).
26. See Note, supra note 22, at 528.
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freedom.27
B. Subsequent Criminal Convictions
A probationer who fails to obey the law, or who is merely sus-
pected of breaking the law, runs a considerable risk of losing his condi-
tional liberty. This is because a judge revoking probation need be only
reasonably satisfied 28 that a probationer violated the condition that he
"obey all laws."
Even in the absence of prosecution or conviction for a subsequent
offense, a revocation judge may have sufficient independent evidence
before him to conclude that a probationer committed a crime. Thus,
prosecution for a subsequent criminal offense is not a prerequisite to
revocation. 29 Moreover, because the state's burden of proof at a crimi-
nal trial is much higher than at a revocation hearing, acquittal of crimi-
nal charges does not necessarily dictate that probation cannot be
revoked on the ground that the probationer committed the crimes
charged.3" In addition, if a criminal prosecution has been started based
on a probationer's conduct, the probation court is not required to await
conclusion of those proceedings before revoking probation based on
that conduct.3'
Three variables can influence the use of a conviction as a basis for
probation revocation. First, the conviction either can serve as sole evi-
dence that the probationer broke the law, or it can be accompanied by
independent evidence. Second, a conviction serving as evidence at a
revocation hearing can be either nonfinal (pending appeal) or final (re-
versed, affirmed, or not appealed). Third, subsequent reversal of a
27. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1971).
28. See supra note 8.
29. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 276-77, 208 A.2d 575, 581 (1965); Riggs v.
United States, 14 F.2d 5, 10 (4th Cir. 1926). The American Bar Association disagrees, say-
ing that it is inappropriate to revoke probation "simply because the defendant has been
arrested for another crime . . . to hold otherwise is effectively to adopt a principle of pre-
sumed guilt." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-7.3 commentary at 513 (1980).
30. Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 276, 208 A.2d 575, 581 (1965); Standlee v. Rhay, 557
F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1977); Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5, 12 (4th Cir. 1926) (Mc-
Dowell, J., concurring). Accord, Murphy v. Turner, 426 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1970) (rev-
ocation of parole); U.S. ex. ret Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 652 (E.D. La. 1970)
(revocation of probation). Acquittals reflect a failure to meet a standard of proof that is not
required at revocation hearings. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. Hutchinson v. State, 44 Md. App. 182, 184, 407 A.2d 359, 360 (1979), aff'd 292 Md.
367, 438 A.2d 1335 (1982) (either proof of a conviction or proof of the commission of acts
constituting a crime is sufficient to support an order of revocation of probation); U.S. v.
Markovich, 348 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1965). At least one jurisdiction, however, has sug-
gested that proceedings to revoke probation should be held in abeyance until after the con-
clusion of the criminal trial. See State v. Renew, 136 S.C. 302, 304, 132 S.E. 613, 614 (1926).
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nonfinal conviction may affect the validity of a revocation based, in
whole or in part, upon that conviction.
Although it is not clear what result will follow from each combina-
tion of these variables, the following principles can be stated with confi-
dence. When a revocation hearing takes place during the time in which
a criminal conviction is awaiting review, the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions hold that revocation need not await disposition of the ap-
peal.3 2 Moreover, revocation may be based solely upon the nonfinal
conviction; the trial judge need not consider independent evidence.33 A
32. See United States v. Gentile, 610 F.2d 541, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Lustig, 555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978). United States v.
Garza, 484 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742, 753-54 (6th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Buck-
elew v. State, 48 Ala. App. 418, 419-21, 265 So.2d 202, 203-05 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1060 (1972); Alexander v. State, 578 P.2d 591, 592-93 (Alaska 1978); State v. Barnett, 112
Ariz. 212, 214, 540 P.2d 684, 686 (1975); Rutledge v. State, 263 Ark. 300, 302, 564 S.W.2d
511, 512 (1978); People v. Ketchum, 185 Cal. App. 2d 620, 621, 8 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612 (1960);
People v. Salazar, 39 Colo. App. 409, 412, 568 P.2d 101, 103 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1039 (1978); State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 79, 327 A.2d 556, 560 (1973); Brand v. State,
123 Ga. App. 273, 274-75, 180 S.E.2d 579, 580-81 (1971); State v. Palama, 62 Hawaii 159,
612 P.2d 1168, 1171-72 (1980); State v. Rasler, 216 Kan. 292, 295-96, 532 P.2d 1077,
1079-80 (1975); Rubera v. Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 177, 181, 355 N.E.2d 800, 803-04
(1976); State v. Oppelt, 601 P.2d 394, 396 (Mont. 1979); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 176,
304 A.2d 647, 648 (1973); State v. Hill, 266 N.C. 107, 111, 145 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1965); State v.
Spicer, 3 Or. App. 80, 471 P.2d 865, 866 (1970).
Only a small minority of courts have taken a contrary view. See, e.g., Ledee v. State,
342 So.2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); but see Stevens v. State, 397 So.2d 398 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (another panel of the same court disavowing Ledee and adopting majority
rule); see also Stoner v. State, 566 P.2d 142, 143 (Cal. Crim. 1977); Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d
138, 141 (Tex. Crim. 1979).
An often-cited premise underlying the majority view is that because a criminal con-
viction is the end result of a trial at which the probationer was entitled to all the protections
afforded a criminal defendant, the conviction is sufficient to satisfy a revocation judge that
the probationer broke the law. Roberson v. State, 501 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1974). A
problem with this premise, however, is that it assumes that the defendant at trial did, in fact,
receive "all the protections" entitled him under the Constitution. If a defendant has ap-
pealed his conviction on the ground that he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine
a witness, for example, it is difficult to argue that he received all constitutional protections at
trial. A more sensible rationale supporting sole reliance on a nonfinal conviction is the
lesser burden of proof required at a revocation hearing as compared to a criminal trial. See
supra note 8. -See also State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 82, 327 A.2d 556, 560 (1973).
The practical effect of postponing revocation until the end of the appellate process
on the conviction is to create a constitutional anomaly. A probationer found to have com-
mitted a felony on the basis of independent evidence introduced at an informal hearing can
be immediately incarcerated, but a probationer who has been convicted after a full criminal
trial may delay revocation through the appellate process. See Roberson, 501 F.2d at 308,
309. See also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484-89.
33. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 370, 438 A.2d 1335, 1337 (1982). See also United
States v. Gentile, 610 F.2d 541, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751,
753 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
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minority of jurisdictions allow revocation to be based upon a convic-
tion that is awaiting review only if there is independent, probative evi-
dence tending to show that the probationer in fact committed the crime
for which he was convicted.3 4 When a court revokes probation based
on its finding of criminal conduct, then a reversal of a conviction result-
ing from the conduct ordinarily does not affect the revocation." If,
however, a conviction by a different court forms the sole ground for
revocation and that conviction is reversed, some courts hold that the
basis for the revocation no longer exists.36 The theory is that a revoking
judge may rely on the findings of another judicial tribunal that a pro-
bationer violated the law, but when those findings are vitiated, so are
any determinations based upon them.37 It is thus the law in some juris-
dictions that when a revoking judge places sole reliance upon a nonfi-
nal conviction and the conviction is subsequently reversed, the
revocation is rendered invalid and a new revocation hearing must be
held. 38 Less clear, however, is whether a reversed conviction may serve
as a partial basis for probation revocation. 39 This question arose in
Dean, but as will be seen the court's opinion leaves it unresolved.
III. THE FACTS OF DEAN AND HUTCHINSON
Bruce Herbert Dean was sentenced to a term of three years in the
penitentiary on June 22, 1978 for receiving stolen goods." His sen-
tence was suspended, and he was placed on probation subject to the
34. See, e.g., State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 79-80, 327 A.2d 556, 559-60 (1973); State
ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 597, 599-600 (Fla. 1962); People v. Hannah, 31 IU.
App. 3d 1087, 1090, 335 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (1975); State v. Guffey, 253 N.C. 43, 45-46, 116
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1960).
35. See State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 79-80, 327 A.2d 556, 559-60 (1973); People v.
Rafter, 41 Cal. App. 3d 557, 561, 116 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283 (1974); In re Martiniz, I Cal. App.
3d 641, 650, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388, 463 P.2d 734, 740 (1972).
36. Hutchinson v. State, 44 Md. App. 182, 186, 407 A.2d 359, 362 (1979) (citing State v.
Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 79-80, 327 A.2d 556, 559-60 (1973)). See also cases cited infra note
37.
37. People v. Lynn, 271 Cal. App. 2d 670, 673, 76 Cal. Rptr. 801, 803 (1969); State exrel
Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 597, 599-600 (Fla. 1962); State v. Blackwelder, 263 N.C. 96,
98, 138 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1964); Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. See supra note 37.
39. In Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 203, 434 A.2d 552, 555 (1981), the Court of Appeals
reversed a probation revocation order based only in part on a conviction subsequently deter-
mined to be invalid. As the analysis in Section IV of this Note will discuss, however, the
presence of independent evidence supporting the revocation order in Dean may have been
irrelevant to its decision to reverse the order. This is suggested, among other things, by the
fact that the Dean court relied on cases in which reversal of the revocation order was based
upon sole reliance on an invalid conviction. See Dean, 291 Md. at 203-04, 434 A.2d at 555
(1981) (citing cases).
40. Id., 434 A.2d at 553.
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condition, among others, that he "obey all laws."'4 1 At a probation rev-
ocation hearing held February 27, 1980, the state alleged that the pro-
bationer had violated that condition.42
The state introduced evidence that on November 16, 1979, the pro-
bationer was convicted of kidnapping.43 Dean's probation officer testi-
fied that the kidnapping conviction was at that time pending appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals."4 The state also relied on the hearsay
testimony of a police officer who had personally investigated the kid-
napping case.45 The officer, relying on statements made by Dean's co-
defendant and the alleged victims (but not upon his own personal
observations), recounted the circumstances surrounding the alleged
kidnapping.' Additionally, the officer made an in-court identification
of the probationer.47 Dean chose not to testify and no other evidence
was presented.48 On the basis of this evidence, the trial court revoked
Dean's probation.49
Dean appealed the revocation of his probation to the Court of
Special Appeals.5" While his revocation appeal was pending, the Court
of Special Appeals reversed and remanded his 1979 kidnapping convic-
tion on the ground that he was denied the constitutional right of in-
formed and comparative challenge of veniremen. 1 The Court of
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 200, 434 A.2d at 553.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 201, 434 A.2d at 554.
50. Id.
51. Dean v. State, 46 Md. App. 536, 545-47, 420 A.2d 288, 194-95 (1980), cert. denied,
434 Md. 552 (1981). The Court of Special Appeals held that a bifurcated peremptory chal-
lenge procedure during the jury selection process denied him this constitutional right. Id.
(citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). Briefly, the court reached this conclusion
because of the following developments during the jury selection process: the defendant and
the state agreed at the outset that the parties would be permitted 80 and 40 peremptory
challenges, respectively. (This was actually 60 challenges more than the defendant was per-
mitted and 30 more than the state was permitted under Maryland Rule 753 a 1). Thus, at
least 132 veniremen were necessary to enable the defense and the state to exercise the
number of challenges that had been agreed upon. The clerk of the court, however, furnished
only 101 veniremen; as a result, the list of 101 was exhausted before the defense had exer-
cised its agreed upon peremptory challenges. In allowing the defense to exercise its remain-
ing challenges from an unknown list of prospective jurors, the trial court denied Dean his
right of comparative rejection, "an important aspect of the right to peremptory challenges
...." Dean, 46 Md. App. at 547, 420 A.2d at 295 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965)).
It may be argued that because Dean was given 60 more peremptory challenges than
19831
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Special Appeals subsequently affirmed the lower court's judgment re-
voking probation, while acknowledging that Dean's kidnapping con-
viction had been reversed.52 The court reasoned that although sole
reliance upon a judgment that is pending on appeal or has been re-
versed would not be proper in revoking probation, the evidence before
the trial court in this case included more than just Dean's kidnapping
conviction.53 The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that
"fundamental fairness" requires that a trial court's revocation order be
reversed when based in part on a conviction subsequently reversed on
appeal.5 4 The court did not order a new revocation hearing.5
Frederick Hutchinson was convicted of murder in the second de-
gree on August 14, 197656 and, like Dean, was placed on probation for
a prescribed period upon the condition that he "obey all laws."57 Dur-
ing the probationary period, be was convicted of rape, and he ap-
pealed.58 On June 21, 1978, the Criminal Court of Baltimore City,
relying solel, on this conviction, determined that Hutchinson had vio-
lated the condition of his probation that he "obey all laws" and conse-
quently revoked his probation.5 9 Hutchinson appealed this revocation
to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that because his conviction
was pending on appeal, it could not serve as the basis for revocation of
probation.6° That court held that probation may be revoked solely on
the basis of a subsequent conviction, notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal.61 This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.62
In both Dean and Hutchinson, the revoking court had before it a
criminal conviction awaiting appellate review as evidence that the pro-
bationer broke the law. At this level, the only distinction between the
he was permitted to under Rule 753 a 1, the error committed by the trial court did not bear
upon the integrity of the guilty verdict. The Court of Special Appeals in reversing Dean's
conviction noted, however, that the excessive number of challenges was "irrelevant," citing
the Supreme Court's rationale that "the denial or impairment of the right [to challenge] is
reversible error without a showing of prejudice." Dean, 46 Md. App. at 547, 420 A.2d at 295
(citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 202) (emphasis supplied by the Court of Special Appeals in Dean).
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals has recognized the impairment of the right of informed
and comparative rejection as an error aiffecting the factfinding procedure at a criminal trial.
52. Dean v. State, No. 155, slip op. (MD. Oct. 17, 1980) (per curiam).
53. Id.
54. Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 203, 434 A.2d 552, 555 (1981).
55. Id., 291 Md. at 204, 434 A.2d at 555.
56. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 368, 438 A.2d 1335 (1982).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id., 292 Md. at 368, 438 A.2d at 1335-36.
61. Hutchinson v. State, 44 Md. App. 182, 186, 407 A.2d 359, 362 (1979).
62. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 370, 438 A.2d 1335, 1337 (1982).
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two cases was that in Dean, unlike Hutchinson, the revoking judge
heard independent evidence of the probationer's alleged failure to obey
the law.6 3 A more important distinction between Dean and Hutchinson
developed after the revocation hearing. In Dean the probation revoca-
tion order was on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals when that
court reversed the conviction which had constituted one of the grounds
for the order.' In Hutchinson, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals
considered the appeal of the revocation order before any appellate
court had an opportunity to decide the appeal of the subsequent con-
viction which formed the sole basis for revocation.65
IV. ANALYSIS OF DEAN AND HUTCHINSON
In Hutchinson, the later of the two cases, the Court of Appeals
simply embraced the majority rule that a nonfinal conviction may serve
as the sole basis for revocation of probation.66 The Court of Appeals'
holding in Dean is less clear. Limited strictly to its facts, Dean holds
that when a conviction is reversed because the offender's right to an
informed and comparative challenge of veniremen has been violated, a
probation revocation based in part upon that conviction also must be
reversed, and no new hearing held, at least where the only other evi-
dence produced at the hearing is hearsay testimony.67 Further under-
standing of Dean must await analysis of the following issues: a) Does
Dean create a retroactive exclusionary rule for reversed convictions?
b) If so, does Dean provide any guidance for the situation in which the
relied-upon conviction is reversed on grounds dissimilar to the basis for
reversal of Dean's kidnapping conviction? c) To what extent does the
Dean court's failure to order a new revocation hearing require that no
new hearing be held in similar cases? Although Dean and Hutchinson
do not provide clear answers to these questions, a useful rule neverthe-
less may be constructed from these two cases.
A. Does Dean Create a Retroactive Exclusionary Rule?
Although the court in Dean did not spell out the basis for its hold-
ing, several possibilities suggest themselves. First, the court may have
believed that a reversed conviction, combined with hearsay testimony,
simply did not constitute sufficient evidence for revocation. The opin-
ion suggests, however, that this reading is improbable. Although the
63. Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 200, 434 A.2d 552, 553 (1981).
64. Id.
65. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 370, 438 A.2d 1335, 1337 (1982).
66. Id.
67. Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 203, 434 A.2d 552, 555 (1981).
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Court of Appeals acknowledged the trial court's partial reliance on in-
dependent evidence, in discussing the basis for its reversal of Dean's
probation revocation it spoke only of the convictions' reversal: "In light
of the trial court's reliance on the kidnapping conviction subsequently
determined to be invalid, fundamental fairness required the Court of
Special Appeals to reverse the trial court's judgment."68 The court did
not discuss the sufficiency of the independent evidence and the reversed
conviction combined, contrary to what one would expect were insuffi-
ciency of the evidence the basis for the court's holding.69
A second possibility is that the court regarded the conviction's re-
versal as a new and material fact unavailable to the revoking judge.
There are no formal rules of evidence at revocation hearings,70 so it
may be appropriate for a revoking judge to accept a reversed convic-
tion with the understanding that it may not be very probative. In
Dean, however, the revoking judge had before him a conviction pend-
ing appeal, not a reversed conviction. Because convictions are reversed
in only a small percentage of cases, 71 the finding of guilt in a conviction
pending appeal is probative evidence that the probationer broke the
law. Thus, at the time of Dean's revocation hearing, the judge proba-
bly accorded much greater weight to Dean's kidnapping conviction
than it ultimately proved to be worth. When these facts came to light
before the Court of Special Appeals, "fundamental fairness" required
reversal of Dean's conviction.
The remaining possibility is a retroactive exclusionary rule.
Under this view, reversed convictions are inadmissible at revocation
hearings. Because the reasons for reversing the conviction existed (al-
beit latently) at the time of the revocation hearing, the conviction will
be treated as having been reversed at that time. The revocation, if
based upon the reversed conviction, must be reversed unless the convic-
tion's admission did not prejudice the probationer's case.72
68. Id.
69. It strains the text of Dean to read the decision as implicitly holding that because the
independent evidence itself was insufficient to support revocation, the revocation order had
to be reversed. The Dean court said in a footnote that in light of its holding, it did not have
to consider the question of whether the probationer was denied his constitutional right to
confrontation of witnesses. Dean, 291 Md. at 203-204, 434 A.2d at 555. It would be odd for
the Court of Appeals to implicitly hold that hearsay evidence is insufficient to support a
violation of probation because it cannot effectively be challenged and, at the same time,
disclaim any opinion on the fairness of denying the probationer such a challenge.
70. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
71. The Office of the Public Defender during fiscal year 1980-81 handled 663 cases on
behalf of appellants in the Court of Special Appeals. Of those, only 79 (12%) resulted in
reversal. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 438 A.2d 1335 (1982).
72. The revocation order would have to be reversed in this event because the revoking
[VOL. 42
PROBATION REVOCATION IN MARYLAND
The court's opinion in Dean does not indicate clearly which of
these last two readings is correct.73 It is submitted, however, that Dean
should be interpreted as establishing a retroactive exclusionary rule,
subject to certain qualifications which are discussed below.74
Failure to recognize an exclusionary rule might cause probation to
be revoked unfairly. Without such a rule, a revoking judge would be
permitted to consider any reversed conviction for what it is worth and
to rely on it, at least in part, in determining that a probationer broke
the law. But the conviction, even if reversed before the revocation
hearing, may prejudice the judge against the probationer. A prior find-
ing of the probationer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may prove
irresistably persuasive to a revoking judge. On appeal, absent a rule
making reliance on such evidence "error," the probationer would be
forced to show that the evidence below was not sufficient for the revok-
ing judge to be reasonably satisfied of the probationer's guilt. The
presence of independent evidence at the hearing may make that burden
almost impossible to carry, even though the revoking judge might have
reached a contrary conclusion had he not been unduly influenced by
the conviction. To permit the revocation to stand under these circum-
stances plainly would be unfair. A retroactive exclusionary rule would
avoid this unsatisfactory result by rendering invalid a revocation based
upon a subsequently or previously reversed conviction. Under the rule
as applied, an appellate court would have a legal basis for addressing
the crucial issue of whether such evidence prejudiced the probationer's
case.
court's reliance on the reversed conviction would not be harmless error. In Maryland, the
harmless error rule requires reversal if inadmissible evidence has been admitted, unless the
record indicates that the factflnder was not influenced by that evidence in making its deter-
mination. Vocci v. Ambrosetti, 201 Md. 475,484, 94 A.2d 437, 441 (1952). See also Conser-
vation Co. v. Stimpson, 136 Md. 314, 333, 110 A. 495, 502 (1920). In the context of a
subsequent reversal of a conviction which formed a partial basis for probation revocation,
the conviction, although technically admissible into evidence while awaiting appellate re-
view, Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 370, 438 A.2d 1335, 1337 (1982), will be regarded as
having been inadmissible at the time the revocation court received it into evidence.
73. Which of these two readings is preferable depends upon where one chooses to place
the emphasis in the discussion of the only factor mentioned by the court as the basis for its
holding: "the trial court's reliance on the kidnapping conviction subsequently determined to
be invalid .... ." Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 203, 434 A.2d 552, 555 (1981) (emphasis
supplied). It is unclear whether the court meant to emphasize the invalidity of the convic-
tion or the fact that its invalidity was determined subsequent to the revocation hearing.
74. Cf. Brown v. State, 4 Md. App. 623, 628, 244 A.2d 471, 474 (1968) (conviction un-
constitutionally obtained by failure to afford defendant counsel or proper opportunity to
intelligently and understandingly waive right to counsel cannot provide proper basis for
revocation of previous grant of probation).
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B. Grounds/or Reversal- Two Rationales
An additional question raised by Dean and Hutchinson is whether
a probation revocation order must be reversed in all cases when the
relied-upon conviction has been reversed. It is well recognized that a
distinction exists between reversal of a conviction on grounds that
question the accuracy of a guilty verdict and grounds based upon po-
lice conduct that a reversal seeks to deter." For example, in many
criminal cases in which a conviction is reversed, it is highly probable
that the defendant broke the law. A clear case is a conviction reversed
because evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was ad-
mitted at trial. In these cases, there is no question as to the accuracy of
a guilty verdict; rather, reversal is premised on collateral policy
grounds.76
The court in Dean said nothing about this distinction. In noting
the reversal of Dean's kidnapping conviction, however, the court spe-
cifically cited the Court of Special Appeals opinion reversing his kid-
napping conviction because of a constitutional defect in the jury
selection process." This reversal did not further a collateral policy
goal such as deterring unlawful police conduct, but rather was based on
the possible inaccuracy of the verdict.
Although Dean does not delimit the reach of its exclusionary rule,
a narrow reading exempting convictions reversed for collateral policy
reasons provides a workable rule. Maryland has not yet decided
whether and to what extent it wants to deter illegal police conduct by
not allowing unconstitutionally seized evidence to be admitted at revo-
cation hearings. Obviously, if Maryland decided to deter investigatory
excesses in this fashion, Dean should be read as creating a limitless
retroactive exclusionary rule. If, on the other hand, Maryland follows
the lead of other jurisdictions that have not sought to control police
conduct through evidentiary rules at revocation hearings,78 then there
is no reason to exclude convictions, retroactively or otherwise, that
75. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976).
76. Id. In Stone, the Supreme Court held that where the state has provided an opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial. Id.
at 482. The Court noted that the exclusionary rule is "calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty. ... Id. at 484
(citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). The Court also noted that this
deterrence goal was "a more pragmatic ground" for the rule's justification than its preven-
tion of the "contamination of the judicial process." Id. at 484.
77. Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 203, 434 A.2d 552, 555 (1981).
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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have been reversed for collateral policy reasons. Unlike convictions
reversed on grounds that impugn the accuracy of the guilty verdict,
these convictions are highly reliable. There is thus no danger that a
revoking judge will be unduly influenced by them, whether they are
reversed before the hearing or after it. To deny a trial court the access
to such highly probative evidence cheats society's interest in incarcerat-
ing a probationer who has failed to obey the law.7 9
Limiting the retroactive exclusionary rule in this fashion may cre-
ate a problem. If a probationer-defendant appeals his subsequent con-
viction, both on grounds that question the accuracy of the guilty verdict
and grounds such as admission of evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment, an appellate court may reverse on the latter
grounds alone. Strict adherence to the modification of Dean's exclu-
sionary rule proposed above would appear to cost the probationer his
liberty based upon a determination by another tribunal which may be
unreliable."0
79. It may be contended that the Court of Special Appeals, in Brown v. State, 4 Md.
App. 623, 244 A.2d 471 (1968), impliedly held that a conviction reversed on any constitu-
tional grounds cannot form the basis for probation revocation (a "limitless" retroactive ex-
clusionary rule). The court held that "if appellant's shoplifting conviction were
unconstitutionally obtained, and the sole reason for the revocation of probation was the fact
of that conviction, then the conviction cannot of itself provide a proper basis upon which to
revoke probation." Id. at 628, 244 A.2d at 474.
Although the holding is broadly stated, the facts of the case suggest that such a broad
rule should not be derived from it. The probationer in Brown had her probation revoked on
the sole basis of a shoplifting conviction. Id. The record of the conviction failed to disclose,
however, whether the probationer-defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived her
right to counsel on the shoplifting charge before pleading guilty. Id. The court remanded
for further proceedings so that the probationer could be afforded the opportunity to produce
evidence that she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to counsel. Id. at 629,
244 A.2d at 474.
At first glance the alleged constitutional infringement may not seem to draw into
question the accuracy of the finding of her guilt. The fact that a guilty plea is voluntarily
made, however, does not foreclose the possibility that it is inaccurate. A defendant who has
not been given the opportunity knowingly and effectively to waive the right to counsel may
elect to plead guilty for reasons other than his actual guilt. For example, a defendant might
plead guilty to protect a culpable relative or acquaintance. Thus, the constitutional infringe-
ment in Brown arguably bore upon the integrity of the guilty verdict and the decision should
not be read as creating a limitless retroactive exclusionary rule.
80. The holding in Brown appears to resolve this problem by allowing a trial court re-
viewing a probation revocation order to examine the basis for the criminal conviction which
formed a basis for the order. The Brown court remanded for further proceedings to let the
revoking court look into the constitutionality of the subsequent conviction. Id. at 629, 244
A.2d at 474. This suggests that an unconstitutionally obtained conviction may not serve as a
basis for revocation even if an appellate court has failed to reverse on grounds questioning
the accuracy of the guilty verdict. The revoking judge should make the determination of
constitutionality himself.
The facts in Brown make it an exceptional case and one in which it was proper for
the revoking judge to look into possible constitutional problems with the conviction forming
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Despite this unacceptable result, Dean's retroactive exclusionary
rule need not be accorded limitless reach. That reading unnecessarily
would require new revocation hearings, involving lengthy presentations
of independent evidence, which would waste scarce judicial resources.
A convenient solution to this dilemma is to consolidate the appeals
from both the subsequent conviction and revocation, and to require the
appellate court to rule at least on all challenges to the accuracy of the
conviction. The appellate court, after disposing of these challenges,
could apply the Dean rule with certainty. Consolidation of the crimi-
nal and revocation appeals is current practice in other jurisdictions and
nothing in current Maryland procedural rules and laws prevents adop-
tion of the practice.8
2
One objection to requiring an appellate court to decide all ques-
tions involving the conviction's accuracy is that such a requirement
might conflict with an appellate court's own considerations of prudence
and economy which normally may motivate it to avoid probing the
validity of a conviction's factual basis unless necessary. If the appeals
were consolidated, however, resolution of these issues could be disposi-
tive of the companion revocation appeal. Hence the court would not be
forced to make potentially unnecessary holdings.
When the conviction appeal reaches an appellate court before the
revocation hearing, consolidation of appeals will not be possible. In
that event it probably goes too far to require the appellate court to pass
on the alleged errors impugning the accuracy of the guilty verdict when
the court wants to reverse solely on collateral policy considerations. In
rare cases such as these, the reversed conviction should not be
admitted.
Consolidation of appeals would prevent the situation in which a
conviction relied upon in a revocation proceeding is reversed after the
revocation has been affirmed. This is the situation troubling Judge Da-
vidson in her Hutchinson dissent.8 3 Even without consolidation of ap-
the basis for probation revocation. Because she in the shoplifting case pleaded guilty with-
out counsel, the likelihood that the defendant would know of any constitutional error was
minimal, as was the likelihood of an appeal. Thus, if the Court of Special Appeals in re-
viewing the probation revocation order had not looked into the circumstances surrounding
the guilty plea, the probationer-defendant would have had no practical remedy for the al-
leged constitutional infringement in the criminal proceeding.
81. See cases cited supra note 37.
82. In other contexts, appeals in Maryland criminal cases are consolidated routinely.
See, e.g., State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981) (three separate criminal appeals
challenging the trial courts' acceptance of guilty pleas consolidated by the Court of
Appeals).
83. See Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 375, 438 A.2d 1335, 1339 (1982) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting).
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peals, however, there is little cause for concern. If the conviction's
reversal fits the Dean rule, then the probationer's continuing custody
would be unlawful despite the revocation's affirmance. Under these
circumstances, the probationer would have a remedy under Maryland's
habeas corpus statute,84 which provides for a de novo hearing when a
prisoner's detention appears to be unlawful.
C. The Dean Court's Failure to Remandfor a New Hearing
So far it has been possible to construct a workable rule from Dean.
The court's unexplained failure to order a new hearing, however, espe-
cially in light of independent evidence in the case, creates a difficulty
that cannot be resolved without going beyond Dean itself. Hutchinson
appears to offer a solution.
Maryland Rule 874 a85 provides that the Court of Appeals, when it
reverses a judgment, must remand for a new trial whenever "it shall
appear to [the court] that a new trial ought to be had. .. "86 Thus, the
84. The Maryland habeas corpus statute, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-701
to 3-707 (1980). Section 3-702 provides:
§ 3-702. Person who may apply for writ.
(a) Petition. - A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his
lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or
any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the end that the
cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.
(b) Procedure upon receiving petition. -Upon receiving the petition, a judge
shall grant the writ of habeas corpus immediately, if it appears that the petitioner is
entitled to the relief.
Federal habeas corpus is also available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976), provided that state
remedies are exhausted. See Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1964). In Hutch-
inson v. State, 44 Md. App. 182, 186 n.2, 407 A.2d 359, 361 n.2 (1979), the Court of Special
Appeals acknowledged the proper use of either habeas corpus or post conviction procedures
to collaterally attack a probation revocation order. In Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1972), and State ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1962), relief from
revocation orders was achieved through habeas corpus, though it was necessary in these two
cases first to establish that the subsequent convictions were invalid.
The habeas corpus remedy will not be barred by res judicata: although the issue of
propriety of revocation will have been finally, and presumably fairly, litigated, a new fact
will have arisen which will have altered the legal relations between the parties involved, i.e.,
the state and the probationer. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162-63
(1945). See also State v. Aeseman's Estate, 18 Mich. App. 91, 104-05, 170 N.W.2d 503, 509
(1969). This new fact is the reversal of the conviction upon which the probation revocation
is based.
85. M.R.P. 874 a provides:
Affirmance or Reversal With New Trial - Removal.
a. Remand for New Trial
Where the judgment from which the appeal was taken shall be affirmed or re-
versed by this Court and it shall appear to this Court that a new trial ought to be had,
such new trial will be awarded and the case remanded to the lower court therefor.
86. Id.
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court's failure to order a new hearing, if accorded precedential effect,
may create a "no new hearing rule." Such a rule would have conse-
quences beyond the Dean holding. Moreover, reversal without remand
for a new hearing might bar, as res judicata,87 subsequent efforts to
revoke probation based on the offense in question. This possibility
would discourage the state from admitting into evidence, and the court
from relying on, nonfinal convictions. That this result was intentional
is suggested by the fact that Judge Davidson, who wrote the majority
opinion in Dean, indicated in her dissent in Hutchinson that trial judges
ought never to rely solely on a conviction pending appeal.88
Despite this evidence of the court's intent, Dean's "no new hearing
rule" is inconsistent with the later case of Hutchinson, which specifi-
cally held that trial courts may rely solely on a conviction pending ap-
peal.89 Although Hutchinson did not address the issue of whether a
new revocation hearing should be held when the relied-upon convic-
tion was reversed, the decision suggests that a new hearing would be in
order. It would make no sense to allow trial courts, and consequently
the state, to rely solely on nonfinal convictions if a reversal without
remand for a new hearing in effect would punish such reliance. It is
true that a new hearing would give the state a "second bite at the ap-
ple" in cases where the revoking court relied solely on the conviction.
But such a result is compatible with the balance struck by the probation
system between societal protection and fairness to the probationer,90
and double jeopardy is not generally held to apply to probation revoca-
tion.9' A new hearing a fortiori should be held in cases like Dean,
where the state profferred probative independent evidence at the first
87. It is an open question in Maryland whether res judicata would operate as a bar
under these facts. The general law of res judicata, however, suggests that the state would be
unable to bring a new revocation hearing based upon the same alleged criminal conduct.
This is because the parties were the same in both cases (the probationer and the state), the
causes of action were the same in both cases (revocation of probation based upon commit-
ting the crime of kidnapping), and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first case.
M.R.P. 870 provides that a reversed conviction is "final and conclusive." See Cook v. State,
35 Md. App. 430,438,371 A.2d 433, 438 (1977),aff'd, 281 Md. 665, 381 A.2d 671 (1978),cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 839 (1978). In the context of probation revocation, the reversal of a proba-
tion revocation order is analogous to a reversed conviction.
In Texas, however, res judicata has been held not to bar successive attempts to re-
voke probation based upon the same probationary violation and fact situation. See Daven-
port v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. 1978).
88. Hutchinson v. State, 292 Md. 367, 374, 438 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1982) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting).
89. Id. at 370, 438 A.2d at 1337.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
91. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980). See aIso Davenport v. State,
574 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Crim. 1978).
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revocation hearing. Hutchinson thus implies that to the extent Dean
established a "no new hearing rule," this rule is no longer viable.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' decisions in Dean and Hutchinson fail to
articulate a coherent system for weighing the effect of a later conviction
on probation revocation in Maryland. As the foregoing analysis sug-
gests, however, it is possible to harmonize the two decisions and draw
from them a rational system.
In this system, Dean stands for the proposition that if a criminal
conviction is reversed on grounds bearing on the integrity of the guilty
verdict, a probationer cannot be incarcerated if the revoking judge was
influenced by that conviction. Hutchinson emphasized that this did not
preclude a trial court from relying, even solely, on a nonfinal convic-
tion. Hutchinson thus implies that because reliance on nonfinal convic-
tions should be encouraged to expedite revocation proceedings, new
hearings necessarily must accompany the reversal of revocation orders
in the event relied-upon convictions are reversed on grounds question-
ing the accuracy of the trial court's finding of guilt. The burden of
considering independent evidence, Hutchinson suggests, need be under-
taken by the court and the state only in the rare event a nonfinal con-
viction forming a basis for revocation is overturned. Hutchinson's
implicit approval of streamlined revocation hearings suggests, more-
over, that Dean should be read narrowly to reduce the amount of nec-
essary rehearings; this result would be accomplished by forcing reversal
of revocation only where the relied-upon conviction was reversed on
grounds bearing on the accuracy of the trial court's verdict.
Finally, neither Dean nor Hutchinson mention the possibility of
consolidating appeals of probation revocation with criminal convic-
tions already pending appeal. In view of the difficulties ameliorated by
this approach, consolidation is perhaps the missing cornerstone to an
effective system suggested by these two perplexing decisions.
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